We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining.
Introduction
Repeated game theory has shown that punishment strategies, strategies contingent on payoff irrelevant histories, greatly expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. Yet in much applied analysis of dynamic games, researchers restrict attention to Markov equilibria, which are equilibria in which behavior does not depend on payoff irrelevant histories. Arguments for focussing on Markov equilibria include (i) their simplicity; (ii) their sharp predictions; * University College London † University of Pennsylvania ‡ Princeton University (iii) their role in highlighting the key payoff relevant dynamic incentives; and (iv) their descriptive accuracy in settings where the coordination implicit in payoff irrelevant history dependence does not seem to occur. However, principled reasons for restricting attention to Markov equilibria are limited in the literature. 1 This paper provides a foundation for Markov strategies for dynamic games with perfect information that rests on two assumptions. First, we make the restriction that all players (except possibly one) must use bounded recall strategies, i.e., strategies that do not depend on the infinite past. Second, we require equilibrium strategies to be "purifiable," i.e., to also constitute an equilibrium of a perturbed game with independent private payoff shocks in the sense of Harsanyi (1973) . Our main result is that Markov equilibria are the only equilibria which are bounded and purifiable.
The purifiability requirement reflects the view that our models are only an approximation of reality, and there is always some private payoff information. We make the modest requirement that there must be some continuous shock such that the equilibrium survives. The boundedness requirement is of interest for two distinct reasons. First, in many contexts, it is natural to assume that there do not exist two players who can observe the infinite past: consider, for example, games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players or in games with overlapping generations players. Second, strategies that depend on what happens in the arbitrarily distant past do not seem robust to memory problems and/or noisy information. While we do not formally model this justification for focussing on bounded memory strategy profiles, we believe it may make them interesting objects of study. 2 Our argument exploits special features of the games we study: only one player moves at a time and there is perfect information. Perfect information and the purifying payoff shocks imply that if a player conditions upon a past (payoff irrelevant) event at date t, then some future player must also condition upon this event. Thus such conditioning is possible in equilibrium only if the strategy profile exhibits infinite history dependence. We thus give the most general version of an argument first laid out by Bhaskar (1998) in the context of a particular (social security) overlapping generations game.
1 One exception is Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) who provides a rationale for Markov equilibria in asynchronous choice games based on complexity costs. We discuss the role of payoff relevance and Maskin and Tirole (2001) in some detail in Section 3.
2 In a different context (repeated games with imperfect public monitoring), Morris (2002, 2006) show that strategies based on infinite recall are not "robust to private monitoring," i.e, they cease to constitute equilibrium with even an arbitrarily small amount of private noise added to public signals. This argument does not apply with simultaneous moves since two players may mutually reinforce such conditioning at the same instant, as we discuss in Section 6.
A Long-Run Short-Run Player Example
Consider the following example of a repeated perfect information game, the chain store game, played between a long run player and an infinite sequence of short-run players. In each period, an entrant (the short run player) must decide whether to enter or stay out. If the entrant stays out, the stage game ends; if he enters, then the incumbent (the long run player) must decide whether to accommodate or fight. The stage game is depicted in Figure 2 .
The short run player maximizes his stage game payoff while the long run player maximizes the discounted sum of payoffs with discount factor δ which is less than but close to 1. Let us assume that the short-run player only observes and thus can only condition on what happened in the last period. The long run player has observes the entire history. We will require equilibria to satisfy sequential rationality -each player must be choosing optimally at every possible history. Ahn (1997, Chapter 3) has studied this type of game, and shows that for generic values of the discount factor, there is no pure strategy equilibrium where entry is deterred. To provide some intuition, restrict attention to stationary strategies. Since the entrant only observes the outcome of the previous period, the entrant's history is an element of A = {Out, A, F}. Consider a trigger strategy equilibrium where the entrant enters after accommodation in the previous period, and stays out otherwise. For this to be optimal, the incumbent must play a strategy of the form: F as long as he had not played A; A otherwise. Such a strategy is not sequentially rational, because it is not optimal to play A when A had been played in the previous period. For in this case, playing A secures a payoff of zero, while a one step deviation to F earns −(1 − δ)c + δ, which is strictly positive for high enough δ.
There are however mixed strategy equilibria where entry is deterred in each period. One such equilibrium has the incumbent playing F with probability 1 2 , independent of history. The entrant is indifferent between In and Out at any information set, given incumbent's strategy. He plays Out at t = 1. At t > 1 he plays Out after a t−1 ∈ {Out, F}; if a t−1 = A, he plays In with probability q = c/[δ(1 + c)], where q was chosen to make the incumbent indifferent between accommodating and fighting. In this equilibrium, the entrant's beliefs about the incumbent's response is identical after the two one-period histories a t−1 = A and a t−1 ∈ {Out, F}. Nevertheless, the entrant plays differently.
We now establish that this mixed strategy equilibrium cannot be purified if we add small shocks to the game's payoffs. So suppose that the entrant gets a payoff shock εz t 1 from choosing Out while the incumbent gets a payoff shock εz t 2 from choosing F. We suppose each z 2 i is drawn independently across players and across time according to some known density with support [0, 1]. The shocks are observed only by the player making the choice at the time he is about to make it. A strategy for the entrant is
while a strategy for the incumbent is
(in principle, it could depend condition on history of past payoff shocks, but this turns out to not matter). Note that ρ t+1 does not condition on what happened at t − 1. Fix a history h t = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) ∈ H t with a t = In (entry at date t) and z t 2 (payoff realization for incumbent). For almost all z t 2 , the incumbent has a unique pure best response. Since ρ t+1 does not condition on h t−1 ,
for almost all z t 2 . So the incumbent does not condition on h t−1 . Now the entrant at t also has a payoff shock. Since the incumbent does not condition on h t−1 ,
) for almost all z t 1 . We conclude that for any ε > 0, only equilibria in Markov strategies exist. In this context, this implies that the backwards induction outcome of stage game must be played in every period.
The Model

The Perfect Information Game
We consider an infinite dynamic game of perfect information, Γ. The game has a recursive structure and may also have public moves by nature. The set of players is denoted by N and the set of states by S, both of which are countable. Only one player can move at any state, and we denote the assignment of players to states by ι : S → N . This assignment induces a partition {S(i) | i ∈ N } of S, where S(i) = {s ∈ S | ι(s) = i} is the set of states at which i moves. Let A denote the countable set of actions available at any state; since payoffs are state dependent, it is without loss of generality to assume that the set of actions is state independent. Let q (s |s, a) denote the probability of state s following state s when action a is played; thus q : S × A → Δ (S). The initial distribution over states is given by q(∅). Player i has bounded flow payoff u i : S × A → R and a discount factor δ i ∈ [0, 1). Total payoffs in the game are the discounted sum of flow payoffs. The dynamic game is given by Γ = S, N , ι, q, (u i ) i∈N .
This formulation allows for both deterministic and stochastic finite horizons: one (or more) of the states may be absorbing, and gives all players a zero payoff.
The game starts in a state s 0 at period 0 determined by q(∅) and the history at period t ≥ 1 is a sequence of states and actions, H t = (S × A) t . Some histories may not be feasible: if after a history h = (s τ , a τ ) t τ =0 , the state s has zero probability under q(• | s t , a t ), then that state cannot arise after the history h. Since infeasible histories arise with zero probability and the set of all histories is countable, without loss of generality our notation often ignores the possibility of infeasible histories. Let H 0 = {∅} and H = ∪ ∞ t=0 H t ; we write h for a typical element of H, τ (h) for the length of the history (i.e., τ (h) is the t for which h ∈ H t ), and H ∞ = (S × A)
∞ for the set of outcomes (infinite histories) with typical element h ∞ . We sometimes write (h, s) for (h, s τ (h) ) = (s 0 , a 0 ; s 1 , a 1 ; . . . , s τ (h)−1 , a τ (h)−1 ; s τ (h) ), with the understanding that s = s τ (h) . Player i's payoff as a function of outcome,
A (behavioral ) strategy for player i is a mapping
Write B i for the set of strategies of player i. A strategy profile b = (b i ) i∈N can be understood as a mapping b : H × S → Δ (A), specifying a mixed action at every history. Write V i (b | h, s) for player i's expected continuation utility from the strategy profile b at the history (h, s). This value is given recursively by
We write
for player i's ex ante utility under strategy profile b.
Definition 1 A strategy b i is Markov if for each s ∈ S(i) and histories h, h ∈ H of the same length (i.e., τ (h) = τ (h )),
A Markov strategy is stationary if the two histories can be of different lengths.
A Markov profile is eventually stationary if there exists such that for histories h and h of possibly different lengths of at least , for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ S(i),
Definition 2 Strategy profile b is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if, for all s ∈ S, h ∈ H, and each i ∈ N and b i ∈ B i ,
If b is both Markov and a SPNE, it is said to be a Markov equilibrium. 3 In Definition 1, we have taken the state space and the corresponding notion of Markov strategy as a primitive. The restriction to Markov strategies is often motivated by the desire to restrict behavior to only depend on the payoff relevant aspects of history. By construction, our states capture everything that is payoff-relevant in the history of the game (but may capture more). Maskin and Tirole (2001) describe a natural and canonical definition of the coarsest possible notion of payoff-relevant (or Markov) state. 4 While in general, two states s and s reached in the same period in S may be payoff equivalent, a sufficient condition ruling this out is that for every pair of such states s, s ∈ S(i), u i (s, a) is not an affine transformation of u i (s , a) (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Proposition 5.6 .2). 5 Note that the set of Markov states does not behave continuously with respect to the payoffs u i (put differently, the set of payoffs for which the set of Markov states in a particular period is given by the states in S reachable in that period is not closed.)
One criticism often made of Markov equilibrium is that it is not continuous with respect to small perturbations of payoffs. In particular, supposeΓ denotes a perturbation of Γ where payoffs are allowed to depend nontrivially on histories,û i : H × S × A → R. Apart from the specification of payoffs, Γ andΓ coincide. Then, for generic assignment of payoffs, every SPNE ofΓ will be Markov, and Markov has no restrictive power inΓ. 6 Moreover, this 3 This solution is sometimes described as "Markov perfect equilibrium" since strategies are required to optimal at unreached states.
4 Loosely, in Maskin and Tirole (2001) , a Markov state is an element of a particular partition over histories H * , where payoff relevance is used to induce partitions over (same length) histories, and H * is the coarsest partition with the property that to every profile measurable with respect to that partition, each player has a best response measurable with respect to that partition.
5 Maskin and Tirole (2001) use cardinal preferences to determine payoff equivalence, and hence the presence of affine transformations. This essentially corresponds to betterresponse equivalence, and is stronger than best response equivalence (Morris and Ui, 2004) .
6 This does not imply that every non-Markov equilibrium of Γ can be approximated by a (Markov) equilibrium in any near-byΓ. Consider, for example, perturbing the incumbent's payoff after F by adding a payoff term ε(h) that is a nontrivial function of history. The trigger strategy profile is now trivially Markov, but may not be an equilibrium. In order for the trigger strategy to be an equilibrium, the following inequality must be satisfied:
where h is any history in which A was never observed while h is any history where at least one A was observed. Since this implies ε(h ) ≥ ε(h ), the trigger profile cannot be an equilibrium for any specification of ε(h) satisfying ε(h ) < ε(h ).
will be true even if |û i (h, s, a) − u i (s, a)| is small. However, as Maskin and Tirole (2001, p. 194) note, one of the philosophical considerations embodied by Markov equilibrium is that "minors causes should have minor effects." 7 We interpret this as a requirement that if two histories are almost payoff irrelevant, then behavior at these two histories should be almost the same. This immediately yields upper hemi-continuity: 8
Lemma 1 Suppose {Γ m } m is a sequence of perturbations of Γ satisfying, for all h ∈ H, for all s ∈ S, and all a ∈ A,
then b * is a Markov equilibrium.
Proof. The profile b * is trivially a SPNE of Γ (this is just upperhemicontinuity of the SPNE correspondence). Fix a state s and two histories of the same length, h and h . For all ε > 0, for sufficiently large m, the convergence of
Many games fit into our general setting: Maskin and Tirole (2001, Section 4) shows that for finite games, generically (in the space of payoffs of Γ), Markov equilibria of Γ can be approximated by Markov equilibria of near-byΓ. In the previous sentence, Markov is used in the Maskin-Tirole sense.
7 This is not simply a technical requirement. Markov in the absence of some kind of continuity requirement can be consistent with behavior that is clearly not in the spirit of Markov, see Proposition 2 and following discussion in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) .
8 The failure of the Markov equilibrium correspondence to be upper hemi-continuous in Maskin and Tirole (2001) (see their footnote 11) is due to their notion of Markov state, and is related to our earlier observation that the set of payoffs for which the set of Markov states in a particular period is given by the states in S reachable in that period is not closed. 1. Repeated perfect information games. The state s tracks play in the perfect information stage game; u i (s, a) is zero whenever (s, a) results in a non-terminal node of the stage game, and is the payoff at the terminal node otherwise.
2. Perfect information games played between overlapping generations of players (Bhaskar (1998) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2006) ).
3. Extensive form games between long-lived and short-lived players. Such games arise naturally in the reputation literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) ; Ahn (1997, Chapter 3)).
4. Infinitely repeated games with asynchronous moves, either with a deterministic order of moves (as in Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a,b) , Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) and Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) ) or with a random order of moves (as in Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) ). 9 In both cases, the state s is the profile of actions of players whose actions are fixed, and u i (s, a) is the stage game payoff.
5. Non-cooperative bargaining. In each period, one proposer makes an offer and other players decide sequentially whether to accept or reject the offer also fit, with both deterministic order of moves (Rubinstein, 1982) and random order (Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta, 1993 ).
Our next example shows that there are interesting Markov equilibria in perfect information games, the possibility for non-stationary Markov behavior, as well as the restrictive power of Markov.
Example 1 (An asynchronous move repeated game) Consider the augmented prisoners' dilemma illustrated in Figure 2 . With asynchronous moves, player 1 moves in odd periods and player 2 in even periods (since time begins at t = 0, player 2 makes the first move). State and action sets are S = A = {c 1 , c 2 , d} and the state encodes the action taken in the previous period (so q (s | s, a) = 1 if s = a and 0 otherwise). Suppose the initial state is given by c 1 . There are two stationary pure strategy Markov equilibria: Let b * : S → A be the Markov strategy given by b * (s) = s. It is straightforward to verify that b * is a perfect equilibrium for δ ∈ 
At (h, c 1 ), the payoff from choosing c 1 , and then following b α , is
while the payoff from choosing c 2 , and then following b α , is
In order for player i to be willing to randomize, (4) must equal (5), with this common value being
1 ) = 9 + δ, and solving (4) for α yields
This is a well defined probability for δ ≥ 1 2 . Moreover, b α , for α satisfying (6), is a Markov equilibrium for δ ∈ 1 2 , 2 3 . For any time t, the nonstationary Markov strategy specifying for periods before or at t, play according to b * , and for periods after t, play according to b α , for α satisfying (6), is a Markov equilibrium for δ ∈ ( ). An outcome path of alternating c 1 and c 2 is the outcome path of a subgame perfect equilibrium that is not the outcome path of any Markov equilibrium.
The nonstationary equilibrium in Example 1 is eventually stationary, and so, in sense, the nonstationarity is trivial and, as we will see, not purifiable. Definition 3 A Markov profile is eventually stationary if there exists a date t such that for histories h and h of possibly different lengths of at least t, for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ S(i),
The next example illustrates nontrivial stationarity.
Example 2 (Pure Markov requires nonstationarity) This example of a coalition formation game is a simplification of Livshits (2002) . There are three players. In the initial period, a player i is selected randomly and uniformly to propose a coalition with one other player j, who can accept or reject. If j accepts, the game is over with payoffs given in Figure 3 . If j rejects, play proceeds to the next period, with a new proposer randomly selected. If no coalition is formed, all players receive a payoff of 0. Note that there is a cycle in preferences: 1 prefers the coalition with 2, who prefers the coalition with 3, who in turn prefers the coalition with 1. For δ < 3/4, there is a unique Markov equilibrium and this equilibrium is stationary and in pure strategies with every proposal immediately accepted. For δ > 3/4, there is no Markov equilibrium in stationary pure strategies. There is a stationary Markov equilibrium in mixed strategies, with the responder randomizing between acceptance and rejection (with probability 3(1 − δ)/δ on acceptance).
If 3/4 < δ < 3/4, there are two nonstationary pure strategy Markov equilibria. In one, offers are accepted in odd periods and rejected in even periods, while in the other offers are accepted in even periods and rejected in odd. (For larger values of δ, pure strategy Markov equilibria display longer cycles.)
An example of a non-Markov equilibrium when 3/4 < δ < 3/4 is the following: in the first period, if 1 is selected, then 1 chooses 3, who accepts (the specification of play after 3 rejects can follow any Markov equilibrium). If 1 chooses 2, then 2 rejects, with play then following the Markov equilibrium with acceptance in odd periods (recall that the first period is period 0, so that after 2's rejection, the next period is odd and so there is immediate acceptance). If 2 or 3 are selected, then play follows the Markov equilibrium with acceptance in even periods.
The Game with Payoff Shocks
We now allow for the payoffs in the underlying game to be perturbed, as in Harsanyi (1973) . We require that the payoff shocks respect the recursive payoff structure of the infinite horizon game, i.e., to not depend upon history except via the state: Let Z be a full dimensional compact subset of R |A| and write Δ * (Z) for the set of measures with support Z generated by strictly positive densities. 10 At each history (h, s), a payoff shock z ∈ Z N is independently drawn according to μ s ∈ Δ * (Z N ). 11 Each player observes only the ith component of the payoff shock profile z i and, if the player moving at state s chooses action a, his payoff is augmented by εz a i , where ε > 0. Thus players' stage payoffs in the perturbed game depend only on the current state, action and payoff shock (s, a, z) and are given bỹ
We denote the perturbed game by Γ (ε, μ).
To describe strategies, we first describe players' information more precisely. Write z i (h, s) for the sequence of payoff shocks realized for player i along (h, s), andz i (h, s) for player i's current shock (thusz i (h, s) is the last element of the sequence z i (h, s)); and z(h, s) for the sequence of payoff shock profiles realized for all players up to (h, s). Hopefully without confusion, we suppress the arguments (h, s), leaving the context to clarify the dimensionality of the various vectors, so that for (h, s),
A behavior strategy for player i in the perturbed game,b i , specifies player i's mixed actionb i (h, s, z i ), at every history (h, s) with s ∈ S(i) and for every realization of i's payoff shocks z i . The set of all behavior strategies for player i is denoted B i .
The definition of sequential rationality requires us to have notation to cover unreached information sets. A belief assessment for player i specifies, for every feasible history h ∈ H and s ∈ S(i), a belief
over the payoff shocks z −i that have been observed by other players at history (h, s). Note that, as suggested by the structure of the perturbed game, we require that these beliefs are independent of player i's private payoff shocks, z i ; beyond this requirement, we impose no further restrictions (such as that the payoff shocks are independent across the other players or periods)-see Remark 1. Player i's "value" function is recursively given by, for a given strategy profileb,
Since player i does not know all the coordinates of z, player i's expected payoff from the profileb is given by
Definition 4 Strategyb i is a sequential best response to (
Strategyb i is a sequential best response tob −i if strategyb i is a sequential best response to (b −i , π i ) for some π i .
Definition 5 A strategyb i is shock history independent if for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S(i), and shock histories z i , z i ∈ Z τ (h)+1 ,
Lemma 2 Ifb i is a sequential best response to anyb −i , thenb i is a shock history independent strategy.
Proof. Fix a player i, h ∈ H, s ∈ S(i), and payoff shock history z. Player i's next period expected continuation payoff underb from choosing action a this period,
Sinceb −i and π h,s i do not depend on player i's shocks before period τ (h), z i \z i , the maximization implies that V i (a,b −i , π i | h, s) also does not depend on those shocks. Thus, his total utility is
Since Z has full dimension and μ s is absolutely continuous, player i can only be indifferent between two actions a and a for a zero measure set of z ∈ Z. For other z, there is a unique best response, and so it is shock history independent.
A shock history independent strategy (ignoring realization of z of measure 0) can be written as
If all players are following shock history independent strategies, we can recursively define value functions for a given strategy profileb that do not depend on any payoff shock realizations:
It is now immediate from Lemma 2 that beliefs over unreached information sets are essentially irrelevant in the notion of sequential best responses, because, while behavior can in principle depend upon prior payoff shocks, optimal behavior does not.
Lemma 3 A profileb is a profile of mutual sequential best responses if, and only if, for all i,b i is shock history independent, and for each h ∈ H, s ∈ S(i) andb i ∈B i ,
Remark 1 Because the perturbed game has a continuum of possible payoff shocks in each period, and players may have sequences of unreached information sets, there is no standard solution concept that we may appeal to. Our notion of sequential best response is very weak (not even requiring that the beliefs respect Bayes' rule on the path of play). The only requirement is that each player's beliefs over other players' payoff shocks be independent of that player's shocks. For information sets on the path of play, this requirement is implied by Bayes' rule. Tremble-based refinements imply such a requirement at all information sets, though they may imply additional restrictions across information sets. This requirement is not implied by the notion of "weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium" from Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) , where no restrictions are placed on beliefs off the equilibrium path: this would allow players to have different beliefs about past payoff shocks depending on their realized current payoff realization. However, Lemma 3 implies that once we impose mutuality of sequential best responses, any additional restrictions have no restrictive power. It is worth noting why no belief assessment π h,s i appears either in the description of V * i , (9), or in Lemma 3: Player i's expected payoff from the profileb, given in (8), is the expectation over past payoff shocks of other players, z −i (h, s), as well as all future payoff shocks. Critically, in this expectation, as implied by the structure of the perturbed game, it is assumed that all future shocks are distributed according to μ, and are independent of all past shocks.
Given Lemma 3 and the discussion in Remark 1, the following definition is natural:
Definition 6 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a profile of mutual sequential best responses.
Even though the private payoff shocks are drawn from a continuum, each period's decision can be viewed as a finite dimensional one, and so existence of PBE is guaranteed for any μ and ε for standard reasons (a sketch of the proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 4 The perturbed game Γ(ε, μ) has a PBE for all ε > 0 and μ with μ s ∈ Δ * (Z N ) for all s ∈ S.
The definition of Markov shock history independent strategies naturally generalizes that for the unperturbed game: a strategyb i is Markov if for each s ∈ S(i), for almost all z ∈ Z, and histories h, h ∈ H with τ (h) = τ (h ),
Definition 7 A shock history independent strategyb i has K-recall if for each s ∈ S(i), histories h, h ∈ H satisfying τ (h) = τ (h ) = t, and almost all z ∈ Z,b
A strategy b i has infinite recall if it does not have K-recall for any K. A Markov strategy is a 0-recall strategy (there being no restriction on h and h ).
A K-recall strategy is stationary if the two histories can be of different lengths. 12
The following is the key result of the paper.
Lemma 5 Ifb i is a sequential best response tob −i and does not have Krecall, then for some j = i,b j does not have (K + 1)-recall.
Proof. Ifb i does not have K-recall, then there exist h and h with τ (h) = τ (h ) = t ≥ K and s ∈ S(i)
for a positive measure of z. Suppose thatb j has (K + 1)-recall for each j = i. Since histories (h, s, a) and (h , s, a) agree in the last K + 1 periods, player i's continuation value from playing action a at (h, s) and at (h , s) is the same, for all s :
Hence, player i's total expected utility from choosing action a at either (h, s)
For almost all z, there will be a unique a maximizing this expression, contradicting our premise (11).
Corollary 1 Ifb is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game, then eitherb is Markov or at least two players have infinite recall.
Example 3 (The Chain Store) It is an implication of Lemma 5 that the one-period recall mixed strategy equilibrium from the chain store game of Section 2 cannot be approximated by any equilibrium of Γ(ε, μ) when the short-lived player is restricted to a bounded recall strategy. On the other hand, the equilibrium can be approximated if we allow the short-lived player to play an infinite recall strategy.
The construction is similar to one described in Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2008, Section 5): For any history h ∈ H ≡ ∪ t {Out, A, F} t , let k(h) be the number of periods of A at the end of h (so that if k(h) = 0, A was not played in the last period, though A may have been played in earlier periods). Define H(κ) ≡ {h ∈ H : k(h) = κ}; the collection {H(κ) : κ ∈ Z + } is a partition of H. Our strategy profile is measurable with respect to this partition. We denote by ρ k : [0, 1] → {Out, In} the strategy of the entrant, and by σ κ : [0, 1] → {A, F} the strategy of the incumbent at any history h ∈ H(κ). Recall that in the mixed strategy we are approximating, the entrant choosing Out after Out and F in the previous period and randomizing with probability c/[δ(1 + c)] on In, and the incumbent randomizing with equal probability on A and F after In. The payoff shocks for the entrant (incumbent, respectively) are drawn from [0, 1] according to the distribution function F 1 (F 2 , resp.).
We begin by setting ρ 0 (z 1 ) = Out for all z ∈ [0, 1), which requires the entrant face a probability of A of no more than (1 + ε)/2. We accordingly set σ 0 (z 2 ) = A for all z 2 ≤ z 0 2 , where z 0 2 satisfies F 2 (z 0 2 ) = (1+ ε)/2, implying a probability of A of exactly (1 + ε)/2 (which can be made arbitrarily close to 1/2 by choosing ε small). The construction proceeds recursively. Let z κ i be the marginal type for player i at a history h ∈ H(κ), so that the probability of In is F 1 (z κ 1 ) and the probability of A is F 2 (z κ 2 ) at such a history. Indifference for the entrant at h requires
yielding an equation determining the incumbent's marginal type as a function of the entrant's:
Turning to optimality for the incumbent, let V κ (A) be the value to the incumbent from playing A at a history h ∈ H(κ) after the entrant chooses In (which is current payoff shock independent), and V κ (F, z 2 ) be the value to the incumbent from playing F at a history h ∈ H(κ) after the entrant chooses In and payoff shock z 2 . Then, for all κ ≥ 0,
where W 0 = 1 is the continuation value to the incumbent of the entrant choosing Out, and V κ is the continuation value to the incumbent at a history h ∈ H(κ) after the entrant has chosen In, but before the incumbent's payoff shock is realized:
Observe that we now have an expression for V κ+1 in terms of z κ+1 2 , which using (12), gives V κ+1 in terms of z κ+1 1 . We thus have an implicit difference equation, since given z κ 1 (and so z κ 2 from (12)), the requirement that z κ
, and so on. Observe that for ε = 0, for all κ ≥ 1,
and F 2 (z κ 2 ) = 1/2, and so for ε small, the implied behavior in Γ(ε, μ) is close the one-period recall mixed strategy equilibrium.
Purification in the Games of Perfect Information
We now consider the purifiability of equilibria in the unperturbed game. Purification has several meanings in the literature (see Morris (2008) ). One question asked in the literature is when can we guarantee that there exists an essentially pure equilibrium in a game by adding noise to payoffs (e.g., Radner and Rosenthal (1982) ). It is trivially true that our shocks ensure that there is an essentially pure equilibrium (we build in enough independence to guarantee that this is the case).
We follow Harsanyi (1973) in being interested in the relation between equilibria of the unperturbed game and equilibria of the perturbed game. But our definition of purifiability is very weak: we require only that there exists a sequence of equilibria of a sequence perturbed games that converge to the desired behavior.
Fix a strategy profile b of the unperturbed game. We say that a sequence of current shock strategiesb k i in the perturbed game converges to a strategy b i in the unperturbed game if expected behavior (taking expectations over shocks) converges, i.e., for each h ∈ H, s ∈ S i and a ∈ A,
Definition 8 The strategy profile b is purifiable if there exist μ k : S → Δ * (Z) and ε k → 0, such that there is a sequence of profiles {b k } ∞ k=1 converging to b, withb k a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(μ k , ε k ) for each k.
Since the supporting sequence of private payoff shocks is allowed to depend on the strategy profile b, and the distribution μ k is itself indexed by k, this notion of purifiability is almost the weakest possible. 13 Our notion crucially maintains the recursive payoff structure of the infinite horizon game (in particular, we require that the payoff shocks are intertemporally independent). Allowing for intertemporally dependent payoff shocks violates the spirit of our analysis.
The strongest notion of purification, closer to the spirit of Harsanyi (1973) , would require that for all fixed private shock distributions μ : S → Δ * (Z), and for all sequences ε k → 0, there is an equilibriumb k of the perturbed game Γ(μ, ε k ) withb k converging to b. We refer to this notion as Harsanyi purification. Clearly, if a profile is Harsanyi purifiable, then it is purifiable.
Our main result is the following:
Proposition 1 If b is a purifiable SPNE in which no more than one player has infinite recall, then b is Markov. Moreover, if b is also eventually stationary, then it is stationary.
Proof. The first assertion is an immediate implication of Corollary 1.
To prove the second assertion, suppose that b is eventually stationary. Then there exists a date t, a state s, and two histories, h and h , of length t such that the profile is stationary after t, and b ι(s) (h, s) = b ι(s) (h , s). But then in near-by games with payoff shocks, there is a positive set of payoff shocks for which the optimal behavior at (h, s) differs from that at (h , s), which is impossible because the continuation play is identical after (h, s, a) and (h , s, a).
We then immediately have (with an argument similar to that proving the second assertion of Proposition 1 implying the second claim).
Corollary 2 If Γ is the infinite repetition of a finite perfect information game with a unique backward induction equilibrium, then the only purifiable equilibrium in which no more than one player has infinite recall is the infinite repetition of the backward induction equilibrium of Γ. If Γ has multiple backward induction equilibria, the only purifiable equilibria in which no more than one player has infinite recall is an infinite sequence of historyindependent specifications of a backward induction equilibrium.
Existence of Markov, purifiable Markov, and
Harsanyi-purifiable Markov equilibria.
The unperturbed game is a particularly simple stochastic game of perfect information, since the set of players, set of states, and set of actions are all countable. The existence of stationary Markov equilibria in behavior strategies follows from Escobar (2008, Corollary 14) . Turning to purifiability, for finite players and states, a direct argument shows that every Markov equilibrium is purifiable, even in the absence of any regularity assumptions or arguments. The proof is complicated by two features: future payoffs (including the contributions from the payoff shocks) affect current values and so the returns from different state transitions, and perturbing actions results in both perturbed flow payoffs and perturbed transitions in the dynamic.
Lemma 6 Suppose there is a finite number of players, N , and S is finite. Every stationary Markov equilibrium in the unperturbed game is purifiable.
Proof. Let b : S → Δ (A) be a stationary Markov equilibrium of the unperturbed game. Write A * (s) for the set of actions that are (possibly weak) best responses at state s. Fix a sequence of Markov strategy profiles
for each a and s) with support of b k (• | s) equal to A * (s). Recall that Z, a full dimensional compact subset of R A , is the support of each player's payoff shocks. Without loss +65+of generality, we may assume the 0-vector is in the interior of Z. For each action a ∈ A * (s), write Z * (a, s) for the collection of payoff shock profiles favoring action a among those played with positive probability, i.e.,
Note that the union of the closures of the sets (Z * (a, s)) a∈A * (s) is Z N , i.e.,
Write a * (z, s) for the action satisfying z ∈ Z * (a, s). (Such an action is unique for almost all z, choose arbitrarily when it is not unique.) For a Markov strategy b , we can write V i (b | s) for the expected payoff to player i from b in the unperturbed game starting in state s. Two matrices, Q and Q k , describe the state transitions under b and b k respectively. Their ss -th elements are given by
For player i, the flow payoffs under b and b k are described by the two |S|-dimensional vectors, u i and u k i , with s-th elements
It is immediate that the vector of values
For k sufficiently large, we can complete the specification of μ k (s) ∈ Δ(Z N ) by choosing a strictly positive density on each Z * (a, s) so that 14
Now consider the strategy profileb k in the perturbed game Γ μ k , ε k given byb
The specification ofb on the (zero measure) boundaries of the sets Z * (a, s) is irrelevant. By construction, expected behavior underb k equals b k . It remains to verify that, for sufficiently large k,b k is a PBE of the perturbed game (i.e., eachb k i is a sequential best response tob k −i ). The expected payoff fromb k evaluated before the realization of the state s payoff shock is denotedṼ
This implies
Since 0 is in the interior of Z, there are both positive and negative values of z a i in Z * (a, s), and since for large k, the right side of (14) is close to 0, such densities will exist.
and soṼ
It is now immediate that eachb k i is a sequential best response tob k −i for sufficiently large k, since the payoff from an action a ∈ A, conditional on the realization z i in the perturbed game is
(Since Z is bounded, even large realizations of z i cannot reverse the strict suboptimality of actions not in A * (s) for sufficiently small ε k ).
We conjecture that with additional regularity assumptions, Markov equilibria will be Harsanyi purifiable. Doraszelski and Escobar (2008) provided conditions for the Harsanyi purifiability of Markov equilibria. While the class of games they study do not encompass those in the present paper, it seems likely that appropriately modifying their method to account for the perfect information structure of the unperturbed game will yield Harsanyi purification of all Markov equilibria for generic games (where the genericity notion will need to reflect our game structure).
Exogenous Memory Bounds
The analysis of Section 3 does not require players to recall the entire history (as required by the definition of perfect information). In particular, suppose each player i has restricted memory in the sense that he or she only knows the previous T i periods (because he or she was not in the game, or forgets earlier periods). If the player knows calendar time, then
If the player does not know calendar time, then a behavior strategy is a mapping
(In both (15) and (16), if player i could be asked to move in a period t < T i , the domain of b i should include shorter histories). The analysis in Section 3 applies essentially without change to either notion of behavior strategy.
(While agents will now have beliefs over actions and states in periods before their memory, these beliefs play no role in the analysis.) This observation immediately yields the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is at most one long-lived player and all the other players are finitely-lived, with a uniform bound on the length of their lives. Suppose there is a uniform bound on the length of history any shortlived player learns at birth. Then, the only purifiable SPNE are Markov. Moreover, if the players do not know calendar time (so that the strategies satisfy (16)), then the only purifiable SPNE are stationary Markov.
Discussion
Our results do not extend to games where more than one player moves at a time, e.g. repeated synchronous move games. Mailath and Morris (2002) and Mailath and Olszewski (2008) give examples of strict, and hence purifiable, finite recall strategy profiles. In this context, one might conjecture a weaker result that purifiability would rule out the "belief-free" strategies developed is the recent literature (Piccione (2002) , Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005) ). Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2008) show that the one period recall strategies of Ely and Välimäki (2002) are not purifiable via one period recall strategies in the perturbed game; however, they are purifiable via infinite recall strategies. The purifiability of such belief free strategies via finite recall strategies remains an open question.
A Omitted Proofs
Sketch of proof of Lemma 4. Consider first perturbed games with a finite horizon and state space (and so finite number of players). From Lemma 2, all sequential best responses must be shock history independent. Moreover, the action specified by sequential best response in a period has a finitedimensional characterization: at each history-state, (h, s), for any two actions a and a , there is a half-space H such that player ι(s) prefer a to a if the payoff shock is in H ∩ Z, and a to a if not. In other words, player ι(s)'s ranking of actions at history (h, s) has a finite dimensional description (since H does). Let Γ η (ε, μ) denote the finite "doubly" perturbed game in which a choice of action a leads to a with probability 1 − η and a uniform distribution over A with probability η. This can be viewed as a finite game, and so it has a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, extracting a convergent subsequence from the sequence of equilibria as η → 0 yields a PBE of the (finite) perturbed game Γ(ε, μ). Finally, consider the general perturbed game Γ(ε, μ) with infinite horizon and/or countably infinite state spaces. Since such a game is continuous at infinity and a similar property is satisfied with respect to the state space, the game can be approximated by a sequence of perturbed games with finite horizons and finite state spaces. A PBE of Γ(ε, μ) can then obtained as the limit of a convergent sequence of PBE of the finite games.
